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1. Introduction 
Tipping is an interesting consumer behavior that has received increased attention 
recently, for several reasons. One reason is the large economic magnitude of tips and the 
prevalence of tipping. Since tips are often unreported for tax purposes (according to 
Hemenway (1993), the only income with a lower compliance rate is illegal income), 
there are no formal figures about the extent of tipping. However, it is not hard to estimate 
it. Sales in the U.S. in 2005 of food and alcoholic beverages to consumers in full-service 
restaurants, snack and nonalcoholic beverage bars, bars and taverns, and lodging places, 
were $164.8, $16.9, $15.3, and $25.2 billion, respectively (U.S. Census Bureau, 2006, 
Table 1269; the numbers are a projection). Summing the four numbers gives sales of 
$222.2 billion. A recent study of tipping in various restaurants (Parrett, 2003, Table 14) 
found that the average tip percentage (a simple average) was 23.22%. However, average 
tip amount was $6.52 and average bill size was $34.67, indicating that the weighted 
average (weighted by the bill size) was a tip of 18.8%. Being conservative, let us 
multiply the latter percentage by $222.2 billion to get estimated annual tips of $41.8 
billion. Obviously, adding tips in other establishments and countries results in a much 
higher figure. In addition, millions of workers in the US derive most of their income 
from tips (Wessels, 1997), and tipping is prevalent in numerous countries and 
occupations (Star, 1988).  
 Another reason for the increased interest in tipping is that firms in industries in which 
tipping exists can benefit from better understanding of various issues related to tipping. 
For example, managers can decide to replace tipping in their firm with compulsory 
service charges. Many US restaurants, for example, do so for large parties (often 6 or 
more diners), calling this fixed service charge a “gratuity.” Whether or not it is beneficial 
to replace tipping with service charges depends crucially on the question whether tipping 
encourages better service quality, a question that is addressed below. As another example 
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for the implications of tipping for firms, managers have to decide to what extent to 
monitor their service workers when tipping exists. Once again, the answer depends on 
whether tipping suffices as a mechanism to ensure good service, which in turn depends 
on the sensitivity of tips to service quality (for formal models analyzing the effect of 
incentives such as tips on firm strategy regarding incentives provision and monitoring, 
see Azar, 2004a; 2006a). 
A third reason for the interest in tipping is that it is a social norm and a form of 
consumer behavior that poses challenges to traditional economic theory. The usual 
assumption in economics, that consumers maximize utility (which is derived from 
consumption of goods and services), implies that people should not tip, because to tip is 
to sacrifice money without receiving anything in return. Because the service has already 
been provided by the time the tip is given, the service provider can no longer change the 
service in response to the tip. Empirical studies, however, show that almost all people tip 
where this is a social norm (Azar, 2006b). Consequently, tipping is an example that 
illustrates the importance of social norms and psychological motivations in economic 
behavior (Azar, 2007a). Moreover, better understanding of the reasons for tipping might 
contribute to our knowledge also about other economic behaviors that result from social 
and psychological motivations, such as donations and gift giving.  
A major issue in the research on the relationship between economics and social 
norms is the question whether social norms are created to improve social welfare. Some 
people believe that social norms exist for various reasons, but not because they improve 
efficiency or welfare (see for example Elster, 1989). The opposite view, that social norms 
increase efficiency, is articulated well by Arrow (1971, p. 22), who wrote, “I want, 
however, to conclude by calling attention to a less visible form of social action: norms of 
social behavior, including ethical and moral codes. I suggest as one possible 
interpretation that they are reactions of society to compensate for market failures.” Two 
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paragraphs below Arrow added, “There is a whole set of customs and norms which might 
be similarly interpreted as agreements to improve the efficiency of the economic system 
(in the broad sense of satisfaction of individual values) by providing commodities to 
which the price system is inapplicable.”  
Several studies tried to examine whether tipping is a norm that increases social 
welfare. Conlin, Lynn, and O'Donoghue (2003), for example, study tipping behavior in 
restaurants, and conclude that it exhibits elements of efficiency, but is not fully efficient. 
Azar (2005a) addresses the question whether tipping was created to increase social 
welfare by examining the difference in the characteristics of various tipped and non-
tipped occupations. Azar (2005b) addresses a similar question with a theoretical model 
that analyzes in what conditions tipping is likely to increase social welfare.  
The reason that tipping can increase social welfare is that tipping encourages the 
waiter to improve the service he provides (in what follows I talk about waiters and 
restaurants, but most of the ideas are also relevant to other occupations in which tipping 
is common). Assuming that the value of improved service quality for the customer is 
higher than its cost to the waiter, it is socially desirable to improve service quality. 
Tipping can increase service quality, however, only if tips are sensitive enough to service 
quality.  
The next section provides a concise literature review of several areas that are related 
to this article. The following section presents a simple model that suggests that service 
quality in equilibrium should be high if tips are very sensitive to service quality, and low 
if tips do not vary a lot as a function of service quality. Section 4 reviews empirical 
results on tipping behavior, and points out “the tipping - service puzzle”: while the effect 
of service quality on tips is very small, service quality is in fact high. Thus, the empirical 
evidence on tipping is inconsistent with the intuitive result that service quality should be 
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low if tips are hardly affected by service quality. The last section discusses this puzzle, 
suggests a few possible explanations for it, and provides several ideas for future research.  
While the evidence that tips are hardly affected by service quality and that service 
quality is ranked as being high by customers existed before, this is the first article that 
points out the inconsistency between these two market characteristics. It is therefore the 
first article to point out and discuss what I denoted "the tipping – service puzzle." This 
puzzle is an important characteristic of the restaurant industry, which is an industry that 
has a large economic significance – as was mentioned before, sales in the restaurant 
industry (including bars and hotel restaurants) in the US alone amount to about $222 
billion annually. Pointing out the puzzle therefore advances our understanding of this 
industry; future research that will attempt to "solve" the puzzle can enhance our 
knowledge even further.  
 
2. Literature review 
The article is related to a couple of research areas, a short discussion of which can be 
helpful. First, the literature on tipping is obviously of particular relevance. While a 
comprehensive review of this literature is beyond the scope of this article, I want to 
briefly discuss the types of research done so far. The most common types of studies can 
be categorized as follows: field experiments, empirical surveys, hypothetical surveys, 
theoretical models, cross-cultural comparisons, managerial implications studies, and 
review articles. Some studies include components of more than one type of study and a 
few others do not fall in any of the above categories, but most tipping studies belong to 
one of the above categories.  
Field experiments often ask the service provider to behave in a certain manner, and 
record the effect of his behavior on tipping. For example, Lynn and Mynier (1993) found 
that squatting during the initial visit to the table increases the waiter’s tip, and Lynn, Le 
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and Sherwyn (1998) found that customers tipped significantly more when touched than 
when not touched and that the duration of the touch (two seconds versus four seconds) 
had no effect on tipping.  
Empirical surveys try to better understand tipping behavior by collecting data on 
actual tipping situations. Usually this is done by surveying customers as they leave a 
restaurant and asking them about the bill size, how much they tipped, service quality, and 
other questions that are of interest for the purpose of the research. Examples for this type 
of study include Lynn and Grassman (1990), Bodvarsson and Gibson (1994), Conlin, 
Lynn, and O'Donoghue (2003), and Bodvarsson, Luksetich and McDermott (2003). 
Hypothetical surveys also ask people about their tipping behavior, but not about 
actual tipping in an actual previous situation, but more generally about tipping in a 
certain scenario. The advantage of hypothetical surveys over empirical surveys is that 
hypothetical surveys allow to ask the subject about his tipping behavior in many different 
circumstances, and thus to examine within subjects how factors such as service quality 
affect tipping (empirical surveys can examine such questions only between subjects). The 
disadvantage of hypothetical surveys compared to empirical surveys is that it is not 
entirely obvious that people indeed tip in the manner they respond when asked about it 
hypothetically. A couple of examples for hypothetical surveys are Bodvarsson and 
Gibson (1999) and Azar (2006b). 
Theoretical models attempt to analyze various issues related to tipping by developing 
a theoretical model of tipping. For example, Schwartz (1997) uses a theoretical economic 
model to show that tipping can increase the firm’s profits when consumer segments differ 
in their demand functions and their propensity to tip. Azar (2004b) presents a model of 
the evolution of social norms and shows that when a norm is costly to follow and people 
do not derive benefits from following it other than avoiding social disapproval, the norm 
erodes over time. Tip percentages, however, increased over the years, suggesting that 
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people derive benefits from tipping including impressing others and improving their self-
image as being generous and kind. Azar and Tobol (2006) present an optimal-control 
model in which tipping behavior creates reputation that affects future service, and find 
that tipping and reputation can evolve in three path prototypes: increasing indefinitely, 
converging to the minimal tip and zero reputation, and converging to an interior 
stationary equilibrium.  
Cross-cultural comparisons examine the differences in tipping practices between 
different countries. Lynn, Zinkhan and Harris (1993), for example, looked at tipping 
practices for 33 service professions in 30 countries and found that tipping was less 
prevalent in countries with low tolerance for interpersonal status and power differences 
and in countries with values that emphasize social over economic relationships. Tipping 
was more prevalent in countries with low tolerance for uncertainty and in communistic 
countries that valued close employee ties to work organizations. Lynn (2000) found 
relationships between the number of tipped professions and national characteristics 
(positive relationship with the level of extraversion and neuroticism and negative with 
the level of psychoticism) in a sample of 21 countries. 
Managerial implications studies discuss how tipping can affect the management of 
businesses in which workers are tipped (mostly restaurants) and often attempt to provide 
advice to managers of such businesses. Casey (2001), for example, argues that tipping 
has important consequences for the relationships among managers, front-line service 
workers, and customers, and for relations among co-workers. She also suggests that 
tipping may influence employee commitment, teamwork, and motivation, and claims that 
while tipping allows low labor costs, it may undermine the relationship between 
managers and staff because the customer becomes the one who provides monetary 
compensation and feedback to the servers. Lynn (1996) suggests that increasing tips can 
help to reduce turnover of servers and to retain the most competent servers. Therefore it 
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is beneficial for the management to advise servers how they can increase their tips. Based 
on various studies of tipping behavior, Lynn suggests that in order to increase their tips 
servers should introduce themselves, squat near the table, smile, touch customers, use tip 
trays with credit-card insignia, and write "thank you" or draw a happy face on customers' 
checks.  
Lynn (2001) quotes two restaurant owners and a restaurant internal document, 
suggesting that restaurant owners consider tipping as a system that gives incentives to 
waiters to put effort at providing good service (and is therefore preferred to fixed service 
charges), that tip averages are the most effective way to measure a server's capabilities, 
and that small tips can help to identify customers who believe they did not receive good 
service. Azar (2004a) examines the optimal choice of monitoring intensity when workers 
face external incentives (incentives that are not provided by the firm), such as tips. 
Increase in such external incentives reduces optimal monitoring intensity but 
nevertheless increases effort and profits unambiguously. The model explains why U.S. 
firms supported the establishment of tipping in the late 19th century but raises the 
possibility that adding service to prices instead of tipping in Europe hurts the interests of 
the restaurant owners. 
Review articles contribute to the tipping literature by summarizing and synthesizing 
the research in dozens of articles that are spread over various disciplines, such as 
psychology, economics, and hospitality management. Sometimes these review articles 
focus on specific aspects of tipping, and they often add original ideas and analysis. A few 
examples of such review articles include Lynn and McCall (2000a), Lynn (2006), and 
Azar (2003; 2007a; 2007b).  
While the above types of studies constitute most of the tipping literature, there are 
additional types that are less common. For example, Ruffle (1998) conducts lab 
experiments that create a situation similar to tipping, Lynn and McCall (2000b) conduct a 
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meta-analysis on the relationship between service quality and tips, Azar (2004c) reviews 
the history of tipping in order to study why people tip and whether tipping improves 
service quality, and Anderson and Bodvarsson (2005) examine whether tipped servers in 
U.S. states with high minimum wages earn more than servers in other states.  
In addition to tipping, another relevant literature is the one on service quality. 
Parasuraman, Zeithaml and Berry (1985), for example, conducted interviews with 
executives and focus groups with consumers, trying to understand the perceptions of both 
managers and consumers about service quality, and to identify gaps between the two 
groups. They investigated four service categories: retail banking, credit card, securities 
brokerage, and product repair and maintenance. One interesting proposition they make is 
that "The quality that a consumer perceives in a service is a function of the magnitude 
and direction of the gap between expected service and perceived service" (Proposition 5, 
p. 46). 
Parasuraman, Zeithaml and Berry (1988) build a 22-item instrument called 
SERVQUAL for measuring consumer perceptions of service quality. SERVQUAL 
addresses many elements of service quality divided into the dimensions of tangibles, 
reliability, responsiveness, assurance, and empathy. Zeithaml, Berry and Parasuraman 
(1996) offer a conceptual model of the impact of service quality on particular behaviors 
that signal whether customers remain with or defect from a company. Empirical results 
examining relationships from the model concerning customers' behavioral intentions 
show strong evidence of their being influenced by service quality.  
Brady and Cronin (2001) find through qualitative and empirical research that the 
service quality construct conforms to the structure of a third-order factor model that ties 
service quality perceptions to distinct and actionable dimensions: outcome, interaction, 
and environmental quality. Each dimension has three sub-dimensions that define the 
basis of service quality perceptions. For each of these sub-dimensions to contribute to 
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improved service quality perceptions, the quality received by consumers must be 
perceived to be reliable, responsive, and empathetic.  
Li, Tan and Xie (2003) suggest that a company's ability to achieve excellent service 
quality depends on the choice of service attributes, their desired levels, and the 
prioritization of service attributes. They investigate the asymmetric and nonlinear nature 
of the relationship between service quality gaps and overall service quality (quality that is 
worse than expected hurts more than quality that is better than expected helps), and 
develop a model that applies utility theory to the prioritization of service attributes. 
 
3. A simple model of tipping 
In order to analyze the relationship between tipping behavior and service quality, it is 
helpful to consider a simple model. Because the purpose of the model is to provide 
predictions that will later be examined using empirical evidence on tipping behavior, the 
model offered is simple, and its results are not intended to be surprising; on the contrary: 
the results are intended to be intuitive – and this emphasizes the puzzle, when it turns out 
that the data contradicts these intuitive predictions.  
The most natural way to model the service provision and the tipping act is as follows. 
In the first stage, the waiter chooses which service quality to provide. Let us denote this 
quality by q. After the service is provided, the customer observes service quality, and 
determines how much to tip.1 The tip, denoted by t, has a monetary cost, which reduces 
                                                 
1 As mentioned in the previous section, some of the literature on service quality suggests that perceived 
quality by the customer depends on the gap between expected and actual service quality (e.g., 
Parasuraman, Zeithaml and Berry, 1985; Li, Tan and Xie, 2003). Here I use q for service quality, without 
incorporating in the model additional variables that relate to the question how exactly q is formed. 
Consequently, there are two possible interpretations of q, and the reader can choose the one he prefers. 
First, q can be interpreted as perceived service quality that is equal to the gap (actual service quality - 
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the amount of money the customer has towards the purchases of other goods. Denote the 
customer's wealth by w and the utility from the consumption of all other goods by the 
function v. The customer's utility function therefore includes a term of v(w – t) which 
captures the fact that tipping more leaves less resources for other consumption. The 
                                                                                                                                                 
expected service quality). The waiter being able to choose q can then be the result of assuming either that 
different customers of the same restaurant have similar expectations about service quality, or that 
customers are heterogeneous in their expectations but the waiter is able to identify the service expectations 
of the customers. Both alternative assumptions lead to the result that the waiter knows the one-to-one 
correspondence between the actual service he provides and q, which implies that he can choose q.  
A second interpretation of the model is that only actual service quality affects tipping (expected service 
quality does not) and q is interpreted as actual service quality. Notice that this still allows the customer to 
have expectations about service quality and to be disappointed or surprised with the service he receives. 
For example, a customer who expects excellent service might plan to tip 20% of the bill. Another customer 
expects only mediocre service and therefore plans to tip 15%. Eventually both receive good service. The 
first customer is disappointed, so he tips less than he planned, say 18%, and the second customer is 
positively surprised and therefore he tips more than he planned – also 18%. This shows that tipping may be 
a function of only actual service quality even if customers also have expectations about service quality and 
their utility is affected by these expectations (through disappointment or positive surprise).  
There are several good reasons to adopt q as service quality without further complicating the model by 
introducing two variables, one for expected service and one for actual service. One reason is that it allows 
to keep the model simpler, the analysis more tractable, and the results more intuitive, simple, and 
convincing. A second reason is that the empirical evidence that is analyzed in the following section based 
on the model has only one measure of service quality – the score that the customer gave to service quality 
after the dining experience. The data in the various empirical studies that are analyzed (and in any other 
tipping study I know of) does not have a separate measure of expected service quality, so introducing into 
the model a variable that has no equivalent in the empirical data it aims to analyze seems pointless. Third, 
this modeling is in line with other theoretical models of tipping, where service quality is measured as a 
single variable and not as a gap between expected and actual service (see for example Azar, 2004a; 2007c). 
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derivative v' is the marginal utility that can be obtained from an additional dollar. The 
standard assumptions in the literature, that v' > 0 and v'' ≤ 0, are also adopted here. 
    While the cost of tipping is clear, its benefits are a bit more complex. The literature 
on tipping (see, for example, Azar, 2004b; 2006b; 2007a) suggests a few possible 
motivations for tipping. One potential reason for tipping is the desire to conform to the 
social norm. In certain situations, such as dining in restaurants, tipping is a social norm, 
and psychologists suggest that we conform to social norms “so that we will be liked and 
accepted by other people” (Aronson, Wilson and Akert, 1999, p. 294). The social norm, 
in turn, might depend on service quality. Etiquette books, for example, suggest that if 
service is bad, the tip can be reduced (Post, 1997).  
Let us denote the social norm about how much should be tipped for a service quality 
of q as n(q). For simplicity, I consider a constant bill size, so even though the tipping 
norm is about the percentage one should tip, this can be easily translated to the dollar 
amount and we can interpret n(q) as dictating the dollar amount one should tip for service 
quality q with this constant bill size. The existence of the social norm does not imply that 
everyone tips exactly what the norm suggests; some people might tip more and others 
less; indeed, empirical data on tipping show significant dispersion in percentage tips 
(Azar, 2004b). However, the existence of the social norm suggests that a possible 
component in the customer's utility function is the difference between his tip and the 
social norm for the service quality he received. Let us denote this component of utility by 
the function h(t – n(q)).  
The customer's psychological utility from the social norm component is higher when 
his tip becomes higher compared to the norm. He obviously should feel better when he 
tips what the norm prescribes than when he tips less than that. But various reasons can 
lead him to want to tip more than the norm, for example in order to show others in the 
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table or the waiter his generosity or his kindness (or simply to feel generous).2 It makes 
sense that what determines generosity is the difference between the tip and the norm and 
not just the tip in isolation of the norm. For example, in countries in which service is 
included in the restaurant's prices (as is common in Europe), a tip of $10 on a $100 bill 
will be perceived as generous, but in the US the opposite will be true. Consequently, let 
us assume that h'  > 0, and also that there is a decreasing marginal utility from tipping 
due to the social norm component, i.e., h'' < 0.  
Another potential reason for tipping is psychological motivations that are not directly 
related to the social norm. For example, people know that waiters rely on tips as their 
major source of income, and therefore they may want to tip because they feel compassion 
for the waiter or because they feel obligated to support his income by tips. People also 
want to reciprocate and to show their gratitude for excellent service by rewarding the 
waiter for his efforts (Azar, 2004b; 2006b). These motivations suggest that another 
component of the utility function can be psychological utility that does not depend on the 
social norm, but might depend on service quality. Let us denote this utility component by 
g(t, q), and assume that the marginal utility of this component is positive but decreasing, 
gt > 0 and gtt < 0. The partial derivative gt captures how much additional utility the 
customer obtains when tipping another dollar. It makes sense that the customer enjoys 
tipping more (so gt is higher) when service quality is higher; for example, when service is 
bad, the customer has less reasons to reciprocate by tipping generously. This implies that 
gtq > 0. One last component of utility that can be added for completeness although it does 
not affect the optimal tipping function is the utility from the dining, d(q), where d' > 0.  
                                                 
2 The reason that people want to feel generous and kind is that it can improve their self-image, which might 
affect their utility, see for example Akerlof and Kranton (2000) and Loewenstein (1999).  
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Let us assume (both for simplicity and because there is no apparent reason to assume 
otherwise) that the utility function is separable in its various components (i.e., there are 
no interaction terms between them). The relative importance of each component is 
captured by a non-negative coefficient multiplying each component except v(w – t). 
However, at least one of the coefficients for the reasons for tipping must be strictly 
positive, otherwise the customer has no incentive to tip.3 The utility function can thus be 
written as: 
u(w, t, q) = v(w – t) + β g(t, q) + γ h(t – n(q)) + δ d(q). 
Let us also assume that the utility function is twice continuously differentiable. 
Assumption 1 summarizes the assumptions discussed above about the various 
components of the utility function: 
Assumption 1: The customer's utility function is twice continuously differentiable 
and it satisfies the following properties:  
β ≥ 0, γ ≥ 0, β + γ  > 0, δ ≥ 0,  v' > 0, v'' ≤ 0, gt > 0, gtt < 0, gtq > 0, h'  > 0, h'' < 0, n'  > 0, 
d'  > 0. 
It is now possible to prove the following proposition:  
Proposition 1: The customer's tipping function is increasing in service quality. 
Proof: The customer maximizes his utility by choosing the tip, given the service 
quality chosen by the waiter in the first stage. The first-order condition is therefore given 
by: ut(w, t, q) = –v'(w – t) + β gt(t, q) + γ h'(t – n(q)) = 0. Differentiating this with respect 
to t once again yields utt(w, t, q) = v''(w – t) + β gtt(t, q) + γ h''(t – n(q)) < 0, where the 
inequality follows from Assumption 1. Therefore, the second-order sufficient condition 
                                                 
3 In that case the customer should not tip, but empirical evidence shows that almost everyone tips when this 
is the norm (Azar, 2006a), and therefore it is reasonable to assume that the representative customer has at 
least one reason to tip.  
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for maximum is satisfied. Next, differentiate the first-order condition with respect to q, 
which gives (omitting the arguments of the functions for the sake of simplicity):  
utq = v''t' + β (gtq + gtt t') + γ (h'' t' – h'' n') = 0, where t' is the derivative of the optimal 
tipping function with respect to q. Rearranging this yields: 
t' = (γ h'' n' – β gtq)/(v'' + β gtt + γh'') > 0, where the inequality follows from Assumption 
1 (because both the numerator and the denominator are unambiguously negative).  
Q.E.D. 
 
Thus, we see that the optimal tipping function implies that the tip should be an 
increasing function of service quality. Since this is a sequential game in which the waiter 
chooses quality first and then the customer chooses the tip, the game is solved by 
backward induction. Once we analyzed the customer's optimal tipping behavior, the next 
step is to find the optimal strategy of the waiter given the customer’s tipping behavior.  
Denote the effort function of the waiter by e(q), i.e., this is the monetary equivalent 
(in terms of the waiter's utility) of the effort required by the waiter in order to provide 
service quality of q. The higher service quality is, the more effort the waiter has to exert. 
Following most of the literature, let us assume that the effort function is convex: as you 
increase quality, it becomes more and more difficult to increase it further. Assume for 
simplicity that the waiter's utility is quasi-linear in his income, and can therefore be 
represented by the following function:  
t(q) – e(q). 
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The optimal choice of service quality is then given by the value q* that solves the 
first-order condition:4 
t'(q*) – e'(q*) = 0. 
This equation suggests the intuitive relationship we would expect between service 
quality and the sensitivity of tips to service quality. When tips are more sensitive to 
service quality (i.e., t' is higher), the value of e'  in equilibrium is also higher. Since e is 
convex, this implies a higher service quality. That is, if customers' tips are very sensitive 
to service quality we should expect a high service quality to be provided, and if tips are 
almost identical regardless of service quality, we should expect bad service quality in 
equilibrium. This is also illustrated in Figure 1. This result is so intuitive that it will be 
surprising if we find out that it does not hold empirically; but this is exactly what the next 
section shows.  
 
4. Empirical evidence on tipping behavior and service quality 
To examine service quality and tipping behavior in restaurants, the results of previous 
empirical studies with particularly large number of observations are reported below. 
Bodvarsson and Gibson (1994) collected data from approximately 700 patrons of seven 
Minnesota restaurants in 1991. Patrons that finished dining were approached and given a 
questionnaire about their dining experience. Two restaurants were high-priced 
atmosphere / specialty restaurants with alcoholic beverages, two were moderately priced 
with alcoholic beverages and specialty menus (one was Mexican and the other 
specialized in seafood), two were low-priced family restaurants with standard American 
                                                 
4 The second-order condition is given by t''(q*) – e''(q*) < 0. In what follows I assume that this condition is 
satisfied. It is easy to see that this is the case if we assume that t is concave or linear. The second-order 
condition may be satisfied, however, even if t is convex, as long as e is "more convex." 
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menus and no alcoholic beverages, and one was a coffee shop. Service quality was 
ranked by the customers on a 0-5 scale, and was on average 4.60 (standard deviation 
0.63), which means that in general customers were very satisfied with the service. 
Bodvarsson and Gibson ran a regression of dollar tips on the bill, service quantity (how 
many dishes and drinks were brought to the table), service quality, and whether the 
customer is regular (dines at the restaurant at least once a month). The regression results 
indicate that each additional point on the service quality scale increased tips on average 
by 12.6 cents (the t-statistic is 1.05)5, suggesting that the waiter has very little incentives 
to make an effort to increase service quality.  
Bodvarsson and Gibson (1997) further examine this dataset, adding to the regression 
a dummy variable for St. Paul restaurants (the other restaurants are from St. Cloud), a 
dummy for lone diners, and a dummy for whether the restaurant serves alcohol. They 
find out in various specifications (reported in Table 4 of their article) that another point in 
the service quality scale increases tips by 6-9 cents, the coefficients being again not 
statistically significant (t-statistics range between 1.31-1.59). They also add a regression 
in which tip percentage rather than dollar tip is the dependent variable. A one-point 
increase in service quality raises tips on average by 0.44-0.54 percent of the bill (in the 
various specifications reported in their Table 5). In this regression the coefficients 
become statistically significant (t-statistics range between 2.10-2.75), but notice that the 
effect of service quality on tips is still negligible. With the sample average of a $28 bill, 
the approximate 0.5% increase in percentage tip obtained by improving service quality 
by one point is only about 14 cents. The negligible effect of service quality on tips is 
even more striking given the low variability in service quality rankings – the number of 
                                                 
5 Taken from the full sample results with service quantity included in the regression, Table 3 in their 
article.  
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observations with service quality of 1, 2, and 3 is 1, 3, and 38, respectively.6 This implies 
that the waiter's ability to increase tips by improving service is very low.  
Conlin, Lynn and O'Donoghue (2003) (henceforth CLO) collected data during 112 
surveys sessions conducted outside 39 restaurants in Houston, Texas. A wide variety of 
restaurants are included in the sample, including restaurants serving Mexican, Italian, 
Thai, and American food. In total, 1393 usable responses were collected.7 The survey 
was answered by the customers who paid the bill and left the tip. Respondents were 
asked various questions, including the following one: "Given a 5 point scale with 1 being 
poor and 5 being excellent, how would you rate the server on:". In the next five lines the 
respondents had to circle a number between 1 and 5 for each of the following 
characteristics: appearance, knowledge of menu, friendliness, speed of service, and 
attentiveness. Servers were ranked high on all these attributes, with average rankings 
being 4.40 in appearance (standard deviation = 0.77), 4.46 in knowledge of menu (s.d. = 
0.81), 4.61 in friendliness (s.d. = 0.71), 4.36 in speed of service (s.d. = 0.91), and 4.33 in 
attentiveness of server (s.d. = 0.94). 
CLO report the results of various specifications. Let us consider first the results 
reported in the first column of their Table 3. In a regression where the dependent variable 
is the percent tip (in percents, i.e. 15% is 15, not 0.15), the coefficients and coefficient 
standard deviations of the various server attributes (ranked by the customer on a 1-5 
scale) were as follows: Appearance: 0.064 (s.d. = 0.469); Knowledge of menu: -0.781 
(s.d. = 0.462); Friendliness: 1.336 (s.d. = 0.716); Speed of service: 1.196 (s.d. = 0.462); 
Attentiveness: -0.475 (0.687). The coefficients of Knowledge and Friendliness are 
                                                 
6 This information is based on the dataset itself and not the articles. I thank Orn Bodvarsson and William 
Gibson for their data and Mike Lynn for help obtaining the data.  
7 The authors discard certain observations such as tables with more than 5 patrons (because in this case the 
tip is often included in the bill already) or tables with multiple checks.  
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statistically significant at 10-percent level, and Speed of service at 5-percent level. The 
authors suggest that the negative coefficient of Knowledge of menu may be a result of 
knowledgeable servers bothering the customer with unimportant information or being 
perceived as "snob." The effect of the various measures of service quality on tips is 
positive for only three of the five, and is statistically significant at the 5-percent level for 
only one, despite the large sample. This shows again that the relationship between service 
quality and tips is rather weak.  
CLO then create an aggregate measure of service quality by taking the average of the 
various server's measures, except for knowledge of menu. A regression that includes this 
aggregate service quality measure instead of the five different variables (Table 3, second 
column) reveals that an increase of 1 point in this variable raises percent tip by 1.464 
(s.d. = 0.551).8 While this coefficient is statistically significant at the 5-percent level and 
much larger than the approximate 0.5% reported in Bodvarsson and Gibson (1997), it is 
still rather small. It means that if the waiter makes an effort and increases each of the four 
measures (appearance, friendliness, speed of service and attentiveness) by one point 
(which is a large increase, given that the variables are on a 1-5 scale and their standard 
deviation is between 0.71 and 0.94), he is tipped 1.464% (of the bill) more. With average 
bill being $26.42 and average percentage tip being 17.56%, this means that all this effort 
increases the waiter's income from tips by less than 39 cents, or about 8% of his tip 
income (the increase in his total income is even smaller, assuming the waiter also 
receives a salary, as required by minimum wage laws9).  
                                                 
8 Notice that the negative coefficient of Knowledge of menu suggests that if the aggregate measure of 
service quality included also Knowledge of menu in the average computed, the coefficient of the aggregate 
measure would have been smaller.  
9 The federal law requires employers to pay $5.15 per hour in general. Tipped workers should also have 
total income (from wages and tips) of at least $5.15 per hour, but their wages can be reduced up to $2.13 an 
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The theoretical model suggested that low sensitivity of tips to service quality should 
result in low service quality in equilibrium, but the empirical evidence shows that while 
tips are hardly affected by service quality, customers rank service quality as being very 
high on average. The co-existence of low sensitivity of tips to service quality and high 
service quality in equilibrium is what I denote "the tipping – service puzzle." It raises the 
question why the theoretical predictions, which seem quite intuitive, do not hold 
empirically. 
The result that tips are affected by service quality very little is also obtained in 
various other studies.10 Lynn and McCall (2000b), for example, evaluates this 
relationship in a meta-analysis of 7 published and 6 unpublished studies involving 2547 
dining parties at 20 different restaurants. Although the average relationship between tip 
size and service evaluations was statistically significant in their meta-analysis, it was also 
quite small – accounting for less than two percent of the variability in tip percentages. 
However, because their meta-analysis does not report the average service ratings in the 
studies included, it is hard to know whether this can be taken as additional support for the 
"tipping – service puzzle" – this depends on whether these studies also involved high 
service evaluations by the customers. The findings in many studies about the weak 
                                                                                                                                                 
hour, using what is called “tip credit” towards the $5.15 minimum wage. Some states adopted different 
laws, however. 
10 One exception is the study of Bodvarsson, Luksetich and McDermott (2003), who argue that using 
different econometric techniques (instead of OLS regression) in their sample of 247 diners in a Central 
Minnesota restaurant reveals a stronger relationship between service quality and tips than in other studies. 
Lynn (2004), however, re-analyzes their data and suggests that the effect of service quality is small (top-
rated service increases tips by not more than 1.5% of the bill amount) and not statistically significant, in 
line with previous research (see also Bodvarsson, 2005 for a reply to Lynn's criticism).  
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The tipping – service puzzle pointed out above is a puzzle that did not receive attention 
in the literature on tipping before. However, it is an important puzzle, because how 
tipping behavior affects service quality is a fundamental question in understanding 
tipping and its implications. Whether the social norm of tipping increases social welfare 
depends crucially on the question whether tipping increases service quality. Although 
service quality is generally high, which could lead us to think that tipping is the incentive 
that causes waiters to provide excellent service, the analysis above shows that the 
sensitivity of tips to service quality is so small that tipping is not likely to be the reason 
for the high service quality. Consequently, tipping, at least in restaurants, does not seem 
to improve social welfare and economic efficiency by improving service quality.  
 So what can explain the puzzling co-existence of high service quality and low 
sensitivity of tips to service quality? One possible explanation is that waiters derive 
satisfaction from doing a good job. The good feeling they obtain when providing good 
service is then another reward they receive for high service quality, which can encourage 
them to provide good service even though doing so hardly increases tips.11  
A second possible explanation is that customers who are unhappy with the service 
may complain to the restaurant manager. The better the service, the lower is the 
probability that the customer will complain. Because complaints are costly for the waiters 
                                                 
11 On psychological motivations that play a role in job satisfaction see Hackman and Oldham (1976) and 
the other literature about Job Characteristics Theory; on job satisfaction in the low wage service sector, 
including the restaurant industry, see Brown and Mcintosh (2003).  
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– they may get punished by the restaurant manager (for example, they may receive less 
attractive tables or shifts, or even get fired) – this creates an incentive to provide good 
service despite the small effect of service on tips.  
A third possible explanation is that the restaurants themselves may be using various 
mechanisms to assure good service quality, and these mechanisms rather than tipping 
yield the good service. Since higher service quality improves the dining experience in the 
restaurant and allows it to attract more customers and to charge higher prices, the 
restaurant might find it beneficial to invest in monitoring workers in order to assure high 
service quality, especially if the managers believe that tips do not provide enough 
incentives for the waiters to give excellent service. Further examination of these 
explanations as well as other potential explanations for the tipping – service puzzle is an 
interesting project that is left for future research.  
 The managerial implications of this study are not clear because of the tipping – 
service puzzle. On one hand, tips are not sensitive to service quality, and this implies that 
managers cannot count on tipping as a sufficient motivation for providing good service, 
and should employ additional measures to ensure good service quality. On the other 
hand, reported service quality is high, suggesting that there is no need in additional 
monitoring of waiters. Future research that addresses the possible explanations for the 
puzzle will probably also shed more light on the managerial implications of the findings 
reported here. 
 Additional worthwhile idea for future research is to address the question what is the 
reason that people leave similar tips for good and bad service. There are several reasons 
why tips might depend on service quality, as pointed out in Section 3. So why despite all 
these reasons tips are hardly affected by service quality? This is an intriguing question 
that calls for additional research.  
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 A final idea for future research is to examine whether the tipping – service puzzle 
exists in additional occupations. For example, are tips in taxicabs also not affected by 
service quality, and if so, is service quality in taxicabs generally ranked as being high? I 
hope that this article will encourage others to add to the growing literature on the 
interesting social norm of tipping.   
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The curve e(q) is the waiter's convex effort function, while t0(q) and t1(q) are two 
alternative tipping functions. The values of q0 and q1 are the optimal choices of service 
quality by the waiter for t0(q) and t1(q), respectively, derived from the first-order 
condition t'(q*) – e'(q*) = 0. Notice that the first-order condition gives the service quality 
for which the difference t(q) – e(q) is maximal, and this difference is the waiter's utility. 
The figure illustrates that a higher sensitivity of tips to service quality (a higher t' – the 
tipping function t1(q) in the figure) leads to a higher service quality in equilibrium.  
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